摘要
In economic allocation problems, egalitarianism and marginalism are two major thoughts to distribute the benefits of cooperation. The α-CIS value reconciles the two thoughts in some variable extent by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. The α-CIS value is the center of gravity of the corresponding α-imputation set given the α-imputation set is nonempty. From the cooperative perspective, we present several axiomatizations of the α-CIS value using α-individual rationality or α-dummifying player property. Finally, we provide a noncooperative interpretation of the α-CIS value by a bidding mechanism.
源语言 | 英语 |
---|---|
文章编号 | 1550031 |
期刊 | Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research |
卷 | 32 |
期 | 5 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 1 10月 2015 |