Abstract
In economic allocation problems, egalitarianism and marginalism are two major thoughts to distribute the benefits of cooperation. The α-CIS value reconciles the two thoughts in some variable extent by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. The α-CIS value is the center of gravity of the corresponding α-imputation set given the α-imputation set is nonempty. From the cooperative perspective, we present several axiomatizations of the α-CIS value using α-individual rationality or α-dummifying player property. Finally, we provide a noncooperative interpretation of the α-CIS value by a bidding mechanism.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 1550031 |
Journal | Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Oct 2015 |
Keywords
- axiomatization
- bidding mechanism
- CIS value
- equal division solution
- TU game