Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value

Genjiu Xu, Han Dai, Haobin Shi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

In economic allocation problems, egalitarianism and marginalism are two major thoughts to distribute the benefits of cooperation. The α-CIS value reconciles the two thoughts in some variable extent by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. The α-CIS value is the center of gravity of the corresponding α-imputation set given the α-imputation set is nonempty. From the cooperative perspective, we present several axiomatizations of the α-CIS value using α-individual rationality or α-dummifying player property. Finally, we provide a noncooperative interpretation of the α-CIS value by a bidding mechanism.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1550031
JournalAsia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research
Volume32
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2015

Keywords

  • axiomatization
  • bidding mechanism
  • CIS value
  • equal division solution
  • TU game

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