Auction-Based Users Dynamic Allocation in Heterogeneous Networks

Yatai Liu, Lixin Li, Wei Liang, Huisheng Zhang, Ang Gao, Xu Li, Zhu Han

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节会议稿件同行评审

4 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

In this paper, we design the cycle auction mechanism to dynamically allocate the users among all base stations (BSS) for single-Tier and two-Tier heterogeneous networks (HetNets) to improve the system spectrum efficiency (SE). The cycle auction algorithm (CAA) is proposed to trade the users with the lowest energy efficiency (EE) among the BSS for both HetNets. The user EE is the basis for the seller to select one user as the goods, and the system SE is the criteria for the auctioneer to determine the buyer who trades the goods with the seller. In a single-Tier HetNet, a small cell BS (SBS) acts as a seller as well as an auctioneer, and the rest of the SBSS can directly quote to the seller. In a two-Tier HetNet, the macro cell base station (MBS) is the auctioneer who can either participate in bidding or sell its user, and the auction results made by the MBS depend on the sellers' reserved price and the buyer's bidding price. Simulation results demonstrate that the CAA can significantly improve system SE in both single-Tier and two-Tier HetNets.

源语言英语
主期刊名2018 IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China, ICCC 2018
出版商Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
636-640
页数5
ISBN(电子版)9781538670057
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2 7月 2018
活动2018 IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China, ICCC 2018 - Beijing, 中国
期限: 16 8月 201818 8月 2018

出版系列

姓名2018 IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China, ICCC 2018

会议

会议2018 IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China, ICCC 2018
国家/地区中国
Beijing
时期16/08/1818/08/18

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