TY - JOUR
T1 - Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
AU - Wang, Zhen
AU - Du, Wen Bo
AU - Cao, Xian Bin
AU - Zhang, Lian Zhong
PY - 2011/4/1
Y1 - 2011/4/1
N2 - A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.
AB - A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Environment
KW - Fitness
KW - Prisoner's dilemma game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79551504862&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.physa.2010.12.003
DO - 10.1016/j.physa.2010.12.003
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:79551504862
SN - 0378-4371
VL - 390
SP - 1234
EP - 1239
JO - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
JF - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
IS - 7
ER -