$$\boldsymbol{\epsilon }$$ -Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Two Order Multi-agent with Disturbance Rejection

Ma Chunhe, Zhang Peng, Yuan Yuan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate an$$\boldsymbol{\epsilon }$$ -Nash Equilibrium seeking problem subject to external disturbance. The game is played by multi-agent with two order integrators under full information. In order to estimate and remedy external disturbance, a static extended stubborn state observer is proposed. An$$\boldsymbol{\epsilon }$$ -Nash Equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed to regulate the action of each agent to around Nash Equilibrium points regard to full information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the validity of the proposed$$\boldsymbol{\epsilon }$$ -Nash equilibrium seeking method.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Guidance, Navigation and Control - Proceedings of 2020 International Conference on Guidance, Navigation and Control, ICGNC 2020
EditorsLiang Yan, Haibin Duan, Xiang Yu
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages3335-3346
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9789811581540
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
EventInternational Conference on Guidance, Navigation and Control, ICGNC 2020 - Tianjin, China
Duration: 23 Oct 202025 Oct 2020

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Electrical Engineering
Volume644 LNEE
ISSN (Print)1876-1100
ISSN (Electronic)1876-1119

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Guidance, Navigation and Control, ICGNC 2020
Country/TerritoryChina
CityTianjin
Period23/10/2025/10/20

Keywords

  • Extended state observer
  • Game theory
  • Nash equilibrium

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of '$$\boldsymbol{\epsilon }$$ -Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Two Order Multi-agent with Disturbance Rejection'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this