TY - JOUR
T1 - Joint Resource Allocation and Incentive Design for Blockchain-Based Mobile Edge Computing
AU - Sun, Wen
AU - Liu, Jiajia
AU - Yue, Yanlin
AU - Wang, Peng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2002-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020/9
Y1 - 2020/9
N2 - Mobile edge computing (MEC), as a promising technology, provides proximate and prompt computing service for mobile users on various applications. With appropriate incentives, profit-driven users can offload multi-task requests across heterogeneous edge servers. However, such incentive trade lacks a trustworthy platform. Due to the decentralized nature of MEC, trading information from players is easily tampered with by edge servers, which poses a threat to cross-server resource allocation. In this paper, we jointly consider incentives and cross-server resource allocation in blockchain-driven MEC, where the blockchain prevents malicious edge servers from tampering with player information by maintaining a continuous tamper-proof ledger database. Particularly, we propose two double auction mechanisms, namely a double auction mechanism based on breakeven (DAMB) and a more efficient breakeven-free double auction mechanism (BFDA), in which users request multi-task service with claimed bids and edge servers cooperate with each other to serve users. A delegated proof of stake (DPoS) based blockchain technology is leveraged to realize decentralized, untampered, safe and fair resource allocation consensus mechanism. The simulation results show that the proposed DAMB and BFDA can significantly improve the system efficiency of MEC.
AB - Mobile edge computing (MEC), as a promising technology, provides proximate and prompt computing service for mobile users on various applications. With appropriate incentives, profit-driven users can offload multi-task requests across heterogeneous edge servers. However, such incentive trade lacks a trustworthy platform. Due to the decentralized nature of MEC, trading information from players is easily tampered with by edge servers, which poses a threat to cross-server resource allocation. In this paper, we jointly consider incentives and cross-server resource allocation in blockchain-driven MEC, where the blockchain prevents malicious edge servers from tampering with player information by maintaining a continuous tamper-proof ledger database. Particularly, we propose two double auction mechanisms, namely a double auction mechanism based on breakeven (DAMB) and a more efficient breakeven-free double auction mechanism (BFDA), in which users request multi-task service with claimed bids and edge servers cooperate with each other to serve users. A delegated proof of stake (DPoS) based blockchain technology is leveraged to realize decentralized, untampered, safe and fair resource allocation consensus mechanism. The simulation results show that the proposed DAMB and BFDA can significantly improve the system efficiency of MEC.
KW - Mobile edge computing
KW - auction
KW - blockchain
KW - cross-server resource allocation
KW - incentive mechanism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091132751&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TWC.2020.2999721
DO - 10.1109/TWC.2020.2999721
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85091132751
SN - 1536-1276
VL - 19
SP - 6050
EP - 6064
JO - IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
JF - IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
IS - 9
M1 - 9113735
ER -