Evolutionary analysis of vaccination strategies for infectious diseases considering neutral strategy

Xueyu Meng, Huiyin Cao, Muhammad Rashid Bhatti, Zhiqiang Cai

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节会议稿件同行评审

1 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game model of epidemic vaccination strategies considering neutral strategy on the homogeneous network. By establishing a state layer and a strategy layer for each individual in the network, we conduct an evolutionary game analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies. Firstly, we take into account various factors such as vaccination effectiveness, government subsidy rate, treatment discount rate, vaccination cost and treatment cost based on the traditional SIR model. We fully analyze various risk factors affecting vaccination. In the strategy layer, we introduce a new neutral strategy. Then, we analyze the proportion of individuals and game benefit of each strategy and use the mean field theory to establish a dynamic equation based on the proposed model. Simulation results show that in order to increase the number of individuals vaccinated when the network evolution is stable, the vaccination effectiveness should be increased and vaccination cost should be reduced. For government decision making, choosing the appropriate vaccination cost determines whether the network evolves towards vaccination strategy.

源语言英语
主期刊名2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2020
出版商IEEE Computer Society
1001-1005
页数5
ISBN(电子版)9781538672204
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 14 12月 2020
活动2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2020 - Virtual, Singapore, 新加坡
期限: 14 12月 202017 12月 2020

出版系列

姓名IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2020-December
ISSN(印刷版)2157-3611
ISSN(电子版)2157-362X

会议

会议2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2020
国家/地区新加坡
Virtual, Singapore
时期14/12/2017/12/20

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