TY - GEN
T1 - Evolutionary analysis of vaccination strategies for infectious diseases considering neutral strategy
AU - Meng, Xueyu
AU - Cao, Huiyin
AU - Rashid Bhatti, Muhammad
AU - Cai, Zhiqiang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/12/14
Y1 - 2020/12/14
N2 - In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game model of epidemic vaccination strategies considering neutral strategy on the homogeneous network. By establishing a state layer and a strategy layer for each individual in the network, we conduct an evolutionary game analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies. Firstly, we take into account various factors such as vaccination effectiveness, government subsidy rate, treatment discount rate, vaccination cost and treatment cost based on the traditional SIR model. We fully analyze various risk factors affecting vaccination. In the strategy layer, we introduce a new neutral strategy. Then, we analyze the proportion of individuals and game benefit of each strategy and use the mean field theory to establish a dynamic equation based on the proposed model. Simulation results show that in order to increase the number of individuals vaccinated when the network evolution is stable, the vaccination effectiveness should be increased and vaccination cost should be reduced. For government decision making, choosing the appropriate vaccination cost determines whether the network evolves towards vaccination strategy.
AB - In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game model of epidemic vaccination strategies considering neutral strategy on the homogeneous network. By establishing a state layer and a strategy layer for each individual in the network, we conduct an evolutionary game analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies. Firstly, we take into account various factors such as vaccination effectiveness, government subsidy rate, treatment discount rate, vaccination cost and treatment cost based on the traditional SIR model. We fully analyze various risk factors affecting vaccination. In the strategy layer, we introduce a new neutral strategy. Then, we analyze the proportion of individuals and game benefit of each strategy and use the mean field theory to establish a dynamic equation based on the proposed model. Simulation results show that in order to increase the number of individuals vaccinated when the network evolution is stable, the vaccination effectiveness should be increased and vaccination cost should be reduced. For government decision making, choosing the appropriate vaccination cost determines whether the network evolves towards vaccination strategy.
KW - Evolutionary game
KW - Mean field theory
KW - Neutral strategy
KW - Vaccination of infectious disease
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099746883&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/IEEM45057.2020.9309955
DO - 10.1109/IEEM45057.2020.9309955
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85099746883
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
SP - 1001
EP - 1005
BT - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2020
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, IEEM 2020
Y2 - 14 December 2020 through 17 December 2020
ER -