Power Allocation Method Based on Two-Stage Stackelberg Game in Wireless Networks

Guangxian Zhang, Rugui Yao, Ye Fan, Xiaoya Zuo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the resource allocation in wireless cooperative networks with multiple selfish but friendly intermediate nodes. To improve the efficiency of power control, we propose a power allocation method based on two-stage Stackelberg game. In this method, the source node is modeled as the buyer, and the relay node and friendly interference node are modeled as sellers. In particular, the source node encourages intermediate nodes to participate in cooperative communication through price incentive, and purchases power from them to improve the system security rate. At the same time, intermediate nodes gain revenue by selling power. In addition, to make selected nodes achieve the maximum system security rate, we introduce a learning-theory based node selection algorithm. Finally, numeri-cal results show that the proposed power allocation method and node selection algorithm can achieve comparable performance to that traditional resource allocation methods.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2021 IEEE Globecom Workshops, GC Wkshps 2021 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781665423908
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021
Event2021 IEEE Globecom Workshops, GC Wkshps 2021 - Madrid, Spain
Duration: 7 Dec 202111 Dec 2021

Publication series

Name2021 IEEE Globecom Workshops, GC Wkshps 2021 - Proceedings

Conference

Conference2021 IEEE Globecom Workshops, GC Wkshps 2021
Country/TerritorySpain
CityMadrid
Period7/12/2111/12/21

Keywords

  • learning theory
  • power allocation
  • two-stage Stack-elberg game
  • Wireless cooperative networks

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Power Allocation Method Based on Two-Stage Stackelberg Game in Wireless Networks'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this