TY - JOUR
T1 - Bounded rationality leads to equilibrium of public goods games
AU - Xu, Zhaojin
AU - Wang, Zhen
AU - Zhang, Lianzhong
PY - 2009/12/4
Y1 - 2009/12/4
N2 - In this work, we introduce a degree of rationality to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate, and with it a new mechanism has been established. Existence of the bounded rationality would lead to a new equilibrium which differs from the Nash equilibrium and qualitatively explains the fundamental role of loners' payoff for maintaining cooperation. Meanwhile, it is shown how the potential strategy influences the players' decision. Finally, we explicitly demonstrate a rock-scissors-paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model.
AB - In this work, we introduce a degree of rationality to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate, and with it a new mechanism has been established. Existence of the bounded rationality would lead to a new equilibrium which differs from the Nash equilibrium and qualitatively explains the fundamental role of loners' payoff for maintaining cooperation. Meanwhile, it is shown how the potential strategy influences the players' decision. Finally, we explicitly demonstrate a rock-scissors-paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=73649110294&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.061104
DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.061104
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:73649110294
SN - 1539-3755
VL - 80
JO - Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
JF - Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
IS - 6
M1 - 061104
ER -