A coalitional power value for set games

Hao Sun; Sheng Gui Zhang; Xue Liang Li

doi:10.1007/s10255-003-0116-0

A coalitional power value for set games

Hao Sun, Sheng Gui Zhang, Xue Liang Li

School of Mathematics and Statistics

Northwestern Polytechnical University Xian

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global efficiency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	417-424
Number of pages	8
Journal	Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica
Volume	19
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10255-003-0116-0
State	Published - 2003

Keywords

Axiomatic characterization
Set games
Value

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10.1007/s10255-003-0116-0

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abstract = "We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global efficiency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.",

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AU - Zhang, Sheng Gui

AU - Li, Xue Liang

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AB - We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global efficiency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.

KW - Axiomatic characterization

KW - Set games

KW - Value

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DO - 10.1007/s10255-003-0116-0

M3 - 文章

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JO - Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica

JF - Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica

IS - 3

ER -

A coalitional power value for set games

Abstract

Keywords

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