摘要
Understanding and predicting the behavior of large-scale multiagents in games remains a fundamental challenge in multiagent systems. This article examines the role of heterogeneity in equilibrium formation by analyzing how smooth regret matching drives a large number of heterogeneous agents with diverse initial policies toward unified behavior. By modeling the system state as a probability distribution of regrets and analyzing its evolution through the continuity equation, we uncover a key phenomenon in diverse multiagent settings: the variance of the regret distribution diminishes over time, leading to the disappearance of heterogeneity and the emergence of consensus among agents. This universal result enables us to prove convergence to quantal response equilibria in both competitive and cooperative multiagent settings. This work advances the theoretical understanding of multiagent learning and offers a novel perspective on equilibrium selection in diverse game-theoretic scenarios.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页(从-至) | 20146-20156 |
| 页数 | 11 |
| 期刊 | IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems |
| 卷 | 36 |
| 期 | 12 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 2025 |
学术指纹
探究 'Regret Minimization in Population Network Games: Vanishing Heterogeneity and Convergence to Equilibria' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的学术指纹。引用此
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver