Location Spoofing Attacks and Defense Strategies on Underwater Geo-Opportunistic Routing Networks

Geo-opportunistic routing (Geo-OR) networks within the Internet of Underwater Things (IoUT) are crucial for addressing the unique challenges of underwater communication environments. By leveraging geographic location data, these networks can opportunistically select forwarding nodes, a strategy that proves particularly effective in the dynamic and unpredictable nature of IoUT. However, uncertainty in forwarder selection and the inability to verify nodes' claimed positions remain critical challenges. This article investigates how uncertainty in next-hop selection arises in Geo-OR when viewed from the perspective of potential adversaries operating in a noncooperative manner. By integrating an octree-based search strategy with an angle-constrained 3-D localization algorithm, we accurately identify and locate 'hot' nodes within Geo-OR. Geometric methods are employed to analyze vulnerable relay regions, pinpointing areas especially susceptible to malicious attacks. Based on this analysis, a location spoofing attack is proposed to disrupt legitimate node transmissions and degrade network performance. Simulation results reveal that the inherent uncertainties in Geo-OR expose the network to significant vulnerabilities, severely compromising throughput. This study highlights the critical weaknesses of Geo-OR, offering valuable insights into the most vulnerable regions and contributing to the design of targeted defense strategies to mitigate these risks.