TY - GEN
T1 - LLMs Caught in the Crossfire
T2 - 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL 2025
AU - Li, Haoyang
AU - Gao, Huan
AU - Zhao, Zhiyuan
AU - Lin, Zhiyu
AU - Gao, Junyu
AU - Li, Xuelong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Association for Computational Linguistics.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has heightened concerns about their security, particularly their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks that leverage crafted prompts to generate malicious outputs. While prior research has been conducted on general security capabilities of LLMs, their specific susceptibility to jailbreak attacks in code generation remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we propose MalwareBench, a benchmark dataset containing 3,520 jailbreaking prompts for malicious code-generation, designed to evaluate LLM robustness against such threats. MalwareBench is based on 320 manually crafted malicious code generation requirements, covering 11 jailbreak methods and 29 code functionality categories. Experiments show that mainstream LLMs exhibit limited ability to reject malicious code-generation requirements, and the combination of multiple jailbreak methods further reduces the model's security capabilities: specifically, the average rejection rate for malicious content is 60.93%, dropping to 39.92% when combined with jailbreak attack algorithms. Our work highlights that the code security capabilities of LLMs still pose significant challenges.
AB - The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has heightened concerns about their security, particularly their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks that leverage crafted prompts to generate malicious outputs. While prior research has been conducted on general security capabilities of LLMs, their specific susceptibility to jailbreak attacks in code generation remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we propose MalwareBench, a benchmark dataset containing 3,520 jailbreaking prompts for malicious code-generation, designed to evaluate LLM robustness against such threats. MalwareBench is based on 320 manually crafted malicious code generation requirements, covering 11 jailbreak methods and 29 code functionality categories. Experiments show that mainstream LLMs exhibit limited ability to reject malicious code-generation requirements, and the combination of multiple jailbreak methods further reduces the model's security capabilities: specifically, the average rejection rate for malicious content is 60.93%, dropping to 39.92% when combined with jailbreak attack algorithms. Our work highlights that the code security capabilities of LLMs still pose significant challenges.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105021051155
U2 - 10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1350
DO - 10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1350
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:105021051155
T3 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics
SP - 27833
EP - 27848
BT - Long Papers
A2 - Che, Wanxiang
A2 - Nabende, Joyce
A2 - Shutova, Ekaterina
A2 - Pilehvar, Mohammad Taher
PB - Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL)
Y2 - 27 July 2025 through 1 August 2025
ER -