Cooperation and Coordination in Heterogeneous Populations with Interaction Diversity

Cooperation, a prosocial behavior enhancing collective rewards in multi-agent games, intricately intertwines with coordination. This study explores how interaction diversity and zero-sum gifting influence cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations, where agents engage in threshold public goods games with multiple equilibria. Our model accommodates two sources of inequality: variations in agents' capabilities to provide public goods and differences in the rewards they receive upon successful public good provision. In the absence of gifting, we demonstrate the inevitability of intermediate interaction intensity in fostering global cooperation, elucidating conditions for co-dominance, coexistence, and the polarized state of cooperation. While gifting introduces reciprocity opportunities, our findings highlight the importance of maintaining moderate levels of gifting, as excessive gifting can paradoxically undermine global cooperation. This research contributes valuable insights into the emergence of cooperation and coordination dynamics.