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A belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy

  • Southwest University
  • Hong Kong Baptist University
  • Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex systems
  • Vanderbilt University
  • Northwestern Polytechnical University Xian

科研成果: 期刊稿件 › 文章 › 同行评审

29 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

As an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory and has attracted growing interest. An ESS can be either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. Even though the randomness is allowed in mixed strategy, the selection probability of pure strategy in a mixed strategy may fluctuate due to the impact of many factors. The fluctuation can lead to more uncertainty. In this paper, such uncertainty involved in mixed strategy has been further taken into consideration: a belief strategy is proposed in terms of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. Furthermore, based on the proposed belief strategy, a belief-based ESS has been developed. The belief strategy and belief-based ESS can reduce to the mixed strategy and mixed ESS, which provide more realistic and powerful tools to describe interactions among agents.

源语言英语
页(从-至)81-86
页数6
期刊Journal of Theoretical Biology
卷361
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 21 11月 2014
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