An Experimental Study Towards the In-Vehicle Network of Intelligent and Connected Vehicles

As the mainstream of future automotive industry, Intelligent and Connected Vehicles (ICVs) have versatile connections between themselves and external devices, although able to provide more conveniences and better driving experiences for the users, also bring forward lots of intrusion portals for the malicious attackers. It is noticed that the final step of almost all attacks in available works, must be at the in-vehicle network, i.e., the CAN bus. Actually, the characteristics of CAN data, specifically, the broadcast transmission on the CAN bus, as well as the unencrypted authentication strategy make the CAN bus vulnerable to various attacks. Different from previous works about CAN bus, we present in this paper a comprehensive study on the in-vehicle network of a modern ICV (a Luxgen SUV), from the perspective of the vehicle auxiliary system. We first clarify the complicated communication process among the smart key, Body Control Module (BCM), and Key Control Unit (KCU), identify the loophole among the Luxgen auxiliary system, and then introduce a practical method to utilize this vulnerability. Finally, extensive experiments have been conducted on the Luxgen SUV where a wireless diagnostic equipment was utilized to achieve successful remote invasion in road tests.