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ϵ-Nash Equilibrium Model Predictive Control for Takagi-Sugeno Fuzzy Multiagent Systems: A Finite-Horizon Noncooperative Game Approach

  • Huaqiao University

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This article addresses a noncooperative game-based model predictive control problem for constrained nonlinear multiagent systems modeled by Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy systems. An M-step fuzzy model predictive control strategy is developed within a noncooperative game framework, where an iterative distributed algorithm is embedded to guarantee convergence to a constrained ϵ-Nash equilibrium (ϵ-NE). A novel objective function is formulated by jointly accounting for system stability, control effort, consensus performance, and interagent disturbance attenuation, thereby promoting recursive feasibility and convergence of the closed-loop system. To address the computational intractability induced by coupling interactions and neighboring disturbances, advanced analytical techniques, including the quadratic bounded method, the Rayleigh-Ritz theorem, and inequality relaxation, are employed to reformulate the original problem into tractable offline and online optimization programs. Furthermore, sufficient conditions are derived to ensure recursive feasibility, consensus, and convergence to an ϵ-NE. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through theoretical analysis and simulation studies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2351-2362
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems
Volume34
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2026

Keywords

  • Distributed fuzzy model predictive control (FMPC)
  • Takagi-Sugeno (T-S) fuzzy systems
  • multiagent systems (MASs)
  • noncooperative games
  • ϵ-Nash equilibrium (ϵ-NE)

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